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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 003168

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [KNNP](#) [KN](#) [JA](#)

SUBJECT: JAPAN'S RESPONSE ON DPRK NUCLEAR DISCUSSION LIST
AND DECLARATION

REF: A. STATE 93191

[1](#)B. TOKYO 3103

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, Reasons 1.4 B/D

[1](#)1. (S) Summary: The Japanese Government agrees with the U.S. approach to discussions with North Korea on the nuclear list and subsequent declaration, according to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Non-Proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division Director Tomiko Ichikawa. In a July 11 meeting with Acting Political Counselor, Ichikawa praised the thoroughness with which the U.S. approach had been prepared and repeatedly expressed appreciation for the opportunity afforded Japan to comment. Ichikawa welcomed the fact that both facilities and materials were covered in all sections and emphasized as "indispensable" the inclusion of nuclear weapons not only in the declaration but also in the discussion phase, as the U.S. approach made clear. Ichikawa conveyed a detailed response (text in paragraph 6) containing Japan's comments on our paper, noting it represented an inter-agency cleared product. She described Japan's suggested changes, e.g., making the plutonium section more inclusive and addressing DPRK research and development activities in all sections, as technical in nature. Ichikawa pledged Japan's continued cooperation, noting it would be essential for us to remain in full agreement if our negotiations with North Korea were to succeed. End Summary.

[1](#)2. (S) In a July 11 meeting with Acting Political Counselor, MOFA Non-Proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division Director Tomiko Ichikawa conveyed Japan's response to the U.S. approach (ref A) to discussions with North Korea on the nuclear list and subsequent declaration. Ichikawa said Japan welcomed the thoroughness with which the U.S. paper had been prepared and stated that Japan was in overall agreement with our approach. She recalled her recent consultations in Washington, noting that many of the ideas discussed at that time were reflected in the U.S. approach.

[1](#)3. (S) Ichikawa noted with satisfaction the fact that nuclear facilities and materials were covered in all sections, and emphasized as "indispensable" the inclusion of nuclear weapons not only in the declaration but also in the discussion phase. She described Japan's suggested changes to

the U.S. approach as technical in nature. For example, she noted that DPRK research and development activities are explicitly mentioned in the section on the uranium program and should be covered in a similar manner in the sections on the plutonium program and weapons. Ichikawa thought the difference might simply be a drafting issue, but wanted to flag the importance of covering R&D activities across the full spectrum of the DPRK nuclear programs. In the section on nuclear weapons program, Ichikawa asked whether the U.S. intended to include missiles.

¶4. (S) Ichikawa asked that the U.S. also consider how to make this part of the Six-Party process move quickly. She noted that IAEA's "normal way of doing business" in verifying nuclear declarations can take years, something that would be unacceptable in the case of North Korea.

¶5. (S) In conclusion, Ichikawa pledged Japan's continued cooperation, noting it was essential that the U.S. and Japan remain in full agreement if our negotiations with North Korea were to succeed.

¶6. (S) Following is the text of Japan's response to the U.S. approach.

Begin text:

Japan's Comments and Questions to the U.S. Non-Paper
"Complete Declaration of DPRK Nuclear Programs"

General
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¶1. We agree with the following approach of the U.S. non-paper:

-- "list" and "the complete declaration" need to cover both facilities and materials.

-- nuclear weapons programs need to be addressed in the discussion of "a list" and included in "the complete declaration."

-- information on R&D, procurement, past activities, personnel and organization is also important. In this connection, it may be good to specifically mention R&D activities including facilities for R&D in addition to "key personnel and organizations" under Next Phase, as they may exist independently from the three categories (plutonium, uranium and weapons.)

¶2. As the U.S. non-paper suggests, the discussion of "a list" will probably be of general nature, setting the scope and depth of the information to be included in "the complete declaration." We would like to know how the U.S. intends to conduct the discussions at each stage, as the description under three categories (plutonium, uranium and weapons) in both Initial Phase and Next Phase include concrete elements, and the exact relations between those elements in Initial Phase and Next Phase are not very clear. (For reference, Japanese non-paper proposes to indicate broad categories in the discussion of "a list" and to include detailed information under each category in "the complete declaration.")

¶3. With relation to the facilities, it is important to include information on location, capacity and design information in addition to operating records.

¶4. We would like to know how the U.S. intends to handle the declaration, in particular, how to ascertain its completeness and correctness in the Six Party process.

Initial Phase

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¶1. Plutonium Programs

-- The first phrase "Includes all DPRK nuclear reactors since they produce plutonium" seems to give a narrow impression as the scope. It would be better to make clear that all the facilities will also be covered, using the same sentence as under Uranium Program: "Includes all activities and facilities related to plutonium production cycle." Also, while the next sentence refers to the entire fuel cycle, it does not address the following elements in the plutonium cycle: uranium mining, yellowcake, U308, UF4 and uranium metal.

¶2. Uranium Programs

-- The first phrase "Includes all activities and facilities related to uranium enrichment, including materials and facilities associated with the production of fuel for reactors" seems to be too wide as the scope for the uranium enrichment programs. It may create confusion between plutonium cycle and uranium cycle. We would like to suggest to move the reference to "production of fuel for reactors" to the section of Plutonium Program, as we understand that "the production of fuel reactors" in the DPRK does not involve uranium enrichment. It would be better to move the elements from uranium mining to uranium metal to Plutonium Programs, or to state that these elements are related to both Plutonium and Uranium Programs.

¶3. Nuclear Weapons Program

-- We would like to know U.S. view on whether or not the

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means of delivery of nuclear weapons should also be addressed in the context of "a list" and "the complete declaration." (It needs to be addressed somewhere in the Six Party Talks.)

Next Phase

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¶1. Plutonium Program

-- It is important to include all programs (including R&D) and all equipment, in the similar way as they are addressed under Uranium Program.

¶2. Uranium Programs

-- The first phrase "Information should be sufficient to enable an accurate determination of the total amount of uranium handled in any way and of the final disposition of any and all uranium..." seems to be too wide as the scope for the uranium enrichment programs, and may create confusion between plutonium cycle and uranium cycle. We would like to suggest to state that these elements are related to both Plutonium and Uranium Programs.

End text.

SCHIEFFER